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ABSTRACT 
The Economic  Recovery  Tax Act of 1981 reduced  personal 
marginal tax rates and provided  significant  business  tax breaks. 
Subsequent  changes  through 1985 cut back on business  allowances. 
The Tax Reform  Act of 1986 reduced marginal  rates again,  but added 
significantly  to business  taxes.  Was there any unifying  theme to 
these tax changes,  or do they represent  frequent changes  in course 
for tax policy? 
This paper  uses a general  equilibrium  model  capable  of second— 
best analysis  to investigate  the net effects on efficiency  of each 
of these changes  in capital  income taxation.  Under the new view 
that dividend  taxes are unimportant  investment  disincentives, 
there  is no set of other parameters  in the model  for which  these 
changes generate improvements  in efficiency.  Under the old view 
that dividend  taxes are important,  however,  these  changes all 
increase efficiency  for a wide range of values for other 
parameters  in the model. 
Don Fullerton  James B. Mackie 
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Charlottesville  VA  22901  Washington, DC  22020 —1— 
I.  Introduction 
Few areas of public  policy have  seen changes  as frequent  or as 
dramatic  as those  in tax policy,  with  major legislation  in almost 
every year from  1980 to 1986.  These tax revisions  may reflect  an 
evolving  economic  environment,  changing  views of individual  leaders, 
or simply shifts  in political  coalitions.  They may appear  almost 
random,  however,  at least with  respect to any one of the multiple 
and sometimes  conflicting  objectives  of tax policy.  We might ask 
whether  these tax changes  reflect any consistency  with respect  to 
revenue, economic  efficiency,  distributional  effects,  or any of a 
number  of noneconomic  objectives  of tax policy. 
Tax initiatives  enacted  during the Reagan Administration  might 
seen  particularly  inconsistent  with respect  to the economic 
efficiency  of taxes on income front capital.  The Economic  Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981  (ERTA) reduced personal tax rates and depreciation 
recovery  periods,  but it favored some assets more than others.  It 
thus appeared  to promote  saving  and capital formation  at the expense 
of a level playing  field,  It also reinforced  a trend in revenue 
sources away from taxes on capital such as the corporate  income tax. 
Subsequent  changes  through  1985 retrenched  somewhat  on the 
generosity  of depreciation  allowances.  Then the Tax Reform Act of 
1986  (TRA)  repealed the investment  tax credit,  lengthened 
depreciation  lifetimes,  and added almost  $30 billion per year of 
revenue  to the corporate  income tax.  Birnbaum and Murray (1987) 
refer to cost recovery provisions  in an Administration  forerunner  of 
the Tax Reform  Act as "an abrupt  about—face,  a 180—degree  reversal —2— 
from four years earlier.  . a  remarkable  flip-flop  (pp. 50-51)  .  It 
may seem almost inconceivable that these  changea were all part of a 
coherent plan. 
There are,  however,  some unifying threads  in these tax 
initiatives.  Both ERTA in 1981 and TRA in 1986 were supported  by 
claims  of  economic  efficiency.  In the former case,  supply—side 
rhetoric  about  work  effort and  saving war  reinforced  by economists' 
measures of  distortions  in households' choices between labor  and 
leisure or between present and  future consumption.  In the latter 
case,  rhetoric  about  the level  playing  field was  reinforced by 
economists' measures of distortions  in  firms'  choices among 
investments.  Moreover,  all  such measures  of economic efficiency  are 
enhanced by lower marginal tax rates.  Birnbeuo and Murray (1987) 
also note that "Reagan wanted to go down in history  as the president 
who cut the top tex rate at least  in half,  from  70 percent  to 35 
percent  or lower,  If abandoning  business  tax breaks and raising 
corporate  taxes was the price he had to pay to achieve that goal,  so 
be it"  (p.  286) 
Were these tax changes essentially  randon, or is there some set 
of prior  beliefs  about parameter  values under  which efficiency 
consistently  increases?  To address this  question,  we measure  the 
economic  efficiency  of capital tax provisions  in this series  of tax 
initiatives  using a disaggregate  general equilibrium  model  of the 
U.S.  economy  end tax system.  This model can measure  second-beat 
efficiency  effects  of personal  and corporate  tax policies,  including 
effects on overall  capital  formation,  end on the allocation  of 
resources  among assets, between  the corporate  and noncorporate —3— 
sectors,  and among industries.  We also point out the importance  of 
key unknown  parameters  such as the elasticity  of substitution  among 
assets  and the elasticity  of savings with respect to the net rate of 
return. 
The generality  of the model is important.  For example, 
Fullerton  and Henderson  (1985) evaluate  the  1981 Act using a more 
restricted  model that concentrates  on intertemporal  distortions.  In 
that  model,  firms use  fixed combinations  of assets,  and ERTA always 
generates  welfare  gains.  Here, we use a more general  model 
developed  by Fullerton  and Henderson (forthcoming)  in which asset 
choices  are endogenous.  In this model,  even with  moderate 
substitution  parameters,  the less uniform taxation  in ERTA can 
generate  welfare  losses.  For another example, Auerbach (1983) and 
Gravelle (1981) concentrate  on asset distortions  but assume 
Cobb—Douglas  production  functions.  Our more general functional 
forms allow us to show  how the ranking of tax reforms  can be 
reversed  for non—unitary  elasticities  of substitution. 
Using results of this model, we interpret  recent tax reform 
history.  We have no formal model of political  decisionmaking,  but 
it is interesting  to see how beliefs  about the relative  importance 
of different  efficiency  effects might  have supported  policymakers' 
views  about the  ranking of alternative  reforms.  ERTA  may have been 
supported  by those  who believed that capital formation  is important 
(or,  in this model, that the saving  elasticity  is high),  but  it 
increases  economic  efficiency  only  when the level playing  field is 
unimportant  (in this model,  when the elasticity  of substitution 
among assets  is low).  The aspects  of the 1986 Act that reversed ERTA  may have been influenced  by changing  beliefs  about  the relative 
size of those parameters  or importance  of those effects. 
Results  also depend  on the assumed effect  of dividend  taxes. 
Under the "new view" that  dividend  taxes have  little effect on 
investment  incentives,  there  is no set of substitution  and  saving 
elasticities  for which these tax initiatives  led to consistent 
improvements  in economic  efficiency.  Under the "old view",  however, 
reduction  of personal  taxes on dividends  does affect  incentives.  In 
this case,  for quite reasonable  bounds on elasticities  in our model, 
every change  in the 1980's led to improvements  in efficiency.  An 
interpretation  is that policymakers  adhere to incremental  reform. 
We emphasize  that  recent tax policy decisions  were  influenced 
by revenue  considerations,  distributional  effects, and noneconomic 
objectives.  Those effects  are entirely  ignored  here  in order to 
focus on efficiency.  The next  section  summarizes  the general 
equilibrium  model used  in this paper.  The third section  provides 
some new results on the efficiency  effects  of recent tax 
initiatives,  A fourth section discusses  scenarios  under  which these 
initiatives  could have led to consistent  increases  in efficiency. 
II. A  General  Equilibrium  Model  for Second-Bestjgency 
Analysis 
The consumption  side of the model is taken from Fullerton, 
Shoveri and Whalley (FSW,  1983), where  households  have initial 
endowments  of labor and capital and maximize  utility  by choosing 
among present  consumption  goods,  leisure,  and saving.  The 
elasticity  of substitution  between  consumption  and  leisure  is —5— 
specified  exogenously  to be consistent  with an uricompensated labor 
supply elasticity (0.15 for these calculations).  Similarly,  the 
elasticity  of substitution  between present  and future consumption  is 
specified  to be consistent  with an uncompensated  saving elasticity. 
This parameter  is set to Boskin's  (1978) estimate  of 0.4 for most 
calculations,  but  it is varied between  0.0 and  0.8 for others.1 
In deciding  how much to save, households  myopically  use current 
prices  as expected future prices.  We then  calculate  a sequence  of 
equilibria  in which endogenous  saving  from one period  augments  the 
capital  stock in the next  period.  Labor force growth  is set 
exogenously  to place the  1980 baseline  equilibrium  on a steady  state 
path.  Domestic  saving  is the only source of investment  funds,  since 
the model is not open to international  capital  flows. 
As in the FSW model, producers  in each of 18 industries  have 
fixed requirements  of intermediate  inputs but can substitute  between 
labor and capital in Constant  Elasticity  of Substitution  (CES) 
value—added  functions,2  As in Fullerton  and Henderson 
(forthcoming),  however,  producers  react to a marginal  cost  of 
capital.  They each use a nested  CES function  to allocate capital 
between  the corporate  and noncorporate  sectors  (or,  in housing, 
between  the rental and owner—occupied  sectors).  The elasticity  of 
substitution  between  sectors does not affect major points made in 
1The saving  elasticity  is used to calculate  the model's  elasticity 
of substitution  between  present  and future consumption  which is 
then fixed  for simulations  of alternative  policies. 
2The model also assumes perfect  competition,  perfect mobility, 
perfect  information,  no externalities,  and no involuntary 
unemployment. —6— 
this paper,  ao it is set to unity for all calculations  reported.3 
In a final CES nest,  for each sector of each industry,  firms 
allocate  capital  anong  up to 28 assets including  20 types of 
equipment  and 15 types of structures,  plus  inventories  and 
residential  and nonresidential  land.  The elasticity  of substitution 
among  assets  is varied  in calculations  below. 
For each asset in each sector the cost of capital is the 
marginal  pretsx  return needed  to earn the equilibrium  posttax 
return4  These calculations  include the effects  of stetutory  tax 
rotes,  investment  tax credit  rates, particular  doprocietion  rules, 
and the personal  taxation  of interest,  dividends,  end cepitel  gsins 
All assets  provide the  same posttax rate of return, hut they must 
earn  different  pretsx  returns or marginal products in order to pay 
taxes that differ  by asset.  Differential  tax rules thus give rise 
to interasset  distortions.  The  "double taxation"  of corporate 
source  income end the nontaxation  of imputed net rents in owner- 
oocupied housing  mean that capital  in different  sectors must  earn 
different marginal products,  giving rise to  intersectoral 
distortions.  Finally, all taxes  on capital drive a  wedge  between 
2No evidence is available on  the elasticity of substitution between 
sectors,  Indeed, little is known  about the incorporation decisions 
of firms,  The  CES  function  is intended only  as a representation of 
that deoision,  and  of the possibility that taxes  affect it. 
4See,  for example,  Hall and Jorgenson  (1967).  We assume a  4 
percent  required real  return net of all taxes  for the original 
(1980) equilibrium,  a constant  4  percent inflation, no uncertainty, 
no  churning,  and sufficient  tax liability  to use all credits and 
deductions.  Effects  of uncertainty  and imperfect  loss  offsets  are 
discussed  in Auerbach (1986). —7— 
the price paid  by firms and the return received  by savers.  Taxes 
thus raise the price of future consumption  and create  intertemporal 
distortions. 
To ensure  comparability,  we wish to abstract  entirely  from 
changes  in government  expenditure.  In addition,  we wish  to 
concentrate  on changes in capital taxes.  Thus  we make each regime 
'revenue neutral"  relative to 1980 by the  imposition  of a lump—sum 
tax or rebate  to households,  and we omit changes  in labor  tax rates. 
Given behavioral  rules and parameters,  the model searches  for 
an equilibrium  by iterating  on a  wage rate, a posttax  rate  of 
return,  and the lump—sun tax (or rebate) needed  to maintain real 
government  expenditures.  At each iteration  the model finds the cost 
of capital  for each asset  in each sector and evaluates  all demands. 
Equilibrium  is found when the total demand for capital matches  its 
fixed supply  for that period, the total demand  for labor matches  its 
endogenous  supply, and total tax revenue  matches  government 
expenditures.  To calibrate  the model,  exogenous  substitution 
parameters  and tax rules are used together with a consistent 
benchmark  equilibrium  data set to solve  for other parameters  that 
allow the model to replicate  the benchmark  data set as an 
equilibrium  solution.  Tax changes then generate  alternative 
sequences  of equilibria  that are compared  to the benchnark  by 
calculating  the present  value of equivalent  variations. 
There are many assumptions  and parameters  that  influence  the 
results  from this model, but three are most important  for present 
purposes.  First, the importance  of intertemporal  effects  is related 
to the prespecified  size of the elasticity  of saving  with respect  to —8— 
the  net rate  of return.  We set thia to 0.4  for moet calculations 
but vary  it fron 0.0 to 0.8 for others.°  Second,  the  importance  of 
interaaaet  effects is related  to the elasticity  of substitution 
among assets  in production.  There is very little evidence  on 
appropriate  values  for this parameter,  so we set it to one for 
standard  calculations  end vary it from zero to 2.0 for comparisons.0 
Finally,  given that the  1986 Act  increases  the capital  gains  tax 
while decreasing  the personal tax on dividen.ds,  the ranking  of these 
reforrs depends in an important way on  the relative weights given to 
those tvo forms of corporate  income,  There  is no  evidence  on  how 
firms finance narginal investment, so we make two  alternative 
assuoptions  One set of calculations sssumea that new  corporate 
investment  is financed  in  the same proportions  as paat investment: 
34 percent  by debt,  62  percent  by retained  earnings,  and  5 percent 
by new  share issues,7  Because the weight  is so low en  new share 
issues,  for which dividand taxes  matter; wa call thia  the  "now  view" 
(see Auarbach,  1979,  Bradford,  1981,  and King,  1977).  The other set 
of calculations  assusas  that corporate eguity  is equally divided 
5Boskin's (1978)  saving elasticity  is  about 0.4, but Howry  and 
Hymans'  (1978) estimate  ia near  zero.  Ballard at  al (1985)  review 
these and  other estimates. 
6Berndt  and Christensen  (1973) found a high elasticity  of 
substitution  between  equipment  and  structures,  but Mohr (1980) 
disputes  it.  These  and other estimates  are reviewed  in Hultan  and 
Wykoff (198  is)  and Mackie (1985).  Our elasticity  of substiution 
among  38 assets has never been estimated. 
7me noncorporate  sector  and housing  are  financed one-third  by debt 
and two-thirds  by equity.  Financing  is exogenous  and identical  for 
all assets.  As a consequence,  we omit tax-related  distortions  in 
firms'  financial  decisicns  and the possibility  that the cost  of 
capital  can be lower  for predominantly  debt—financed  assets. 
Debt-equity  ratios are not available  by asset,  but  see Gordon, 
Hines,  and Summers  (1987). —9— 
between retained  earnings  and new share  issues.  Dividend  taxes are 
more important,  and so we call this the  to1d viewit  (see McLure, 
1979) 
8 
III. The  Effects of Tax Reforms 
In 1980, when President  Reagan  was elected,  the top statutory 
corporate  tax rate  was 46 percent,  end personal  rates extended  up to 
70 percent.9  Most equipment  received  a 10 percent  investment  tax 
credit, and capital  cost recovery periods  were based on the Asset 
Depreciation  Range (ADR)  system.  Besides  lowering  all personal 
rates,  including  the top rate  from 70 to 50 percent,  the Economic 
Recovery  Tax Act of 1981 expanded the investment  tax credit and 
created  the Accelerated  Cost Recovery  System  (ACRS) which shortened 
all depreciation  lifetimes.  Table  1 shows that the  fully phased—in 
version  of this  bill would have  lowered the cost of capital in the 
corporate  sector  from 7.0 to 5.9 percent under the new view  (8.5 to 
7.0 percent  under the old view).  ERTA also reduces  the overall cost 
of capital,  which includes  the noncorporate  sector  and owner— 
occupied  housing. 
To indicate  tax differences  across  sectors or across assets, 
the table also shows the coefficient  of variation  of the cost of 
8Empirically,  the new view  is supported  in Auerbach (1984), but the 
old view is supported  in Poterba and Summers  (1983, 1985).  Poterba 
and Summers  (1985) explain  some conceptual  problems  with each  view. 
9For each tax law, the Treasury's  individual  tax file with  90,000 
households  was used to calculate  the weighted—average  personal 
marginal  rate  on interest  receipts,  dividends,  capital  gains, 
noncorporate  business income, and mortgage interest  deductions. 
These rates were then modified  to account for taxes  at the  state 
level, the taxation  of banks,  insurance  companies,  and the holdings 
of tax-exempt  institutions. —10— 
capital tinder  each tax regime.  By reducing the taxation of 
depreciable  asseta in the corporate sector,  ERTA brought overall 
corporate taxes sore  in  line  with  other sectors and  conseguently 
reduced  slightly  the coefficient  of variation  across sectors. 
However, EPTA  widened  the difference  between depreciable  assets and 
other assets  such as land and inventories.'0  Both across  assets and 
overall, ERTA  has the largest coefficient  of variation  of the  four 
tax regises. 
Further changes  ware enacted  each year through 1985.  The rate 
of declining  balance for depreciation  was reduced.,  and the deprecia- 
tion lifetime for structures was  increased.  In addition,  inflation 
eroded some of the personal rate reduction  through bracket creep. 
By  1985,  when  brackets  were  to be  indexed,  the cost of capital  in 
the  corporate  sector bad risen  back  up from 5.9 under ERTA  to 6,5 
percent,  using the new view  financing  assunptions  (from 7.0  to 7.7 
percent using the old view).  The coefficient  of variation  across 
assets fell back from .37 to .25 as shown in Table  1. 
The Tax Reform  Act of 1986 revamped  tax rulss  again.  Personal 
tax rates were  reduced to a top marginal  rate of 33 percent,  and the 
statutory  corporate  rate was cut  from 46to  34 percent.  The 
investment  tax credit  was repealed,  and depreciable  assets were 
divided  into a larger number  of categories  intended  to reflect 
10The accelerated  depreciation  in ERTA  may have  been intended  to 
offset  the effects  of high  inflation,  At our  4 percent inflation 
rate, however,  the combination  of the investment  tax credit  and 
ACRS meant that equipment  investment  actually  received  a net 
subsidy  at the corporate  level. —11— 
differences  in economic  depreciation.  Finally,  the  1986 Act 
repealed  the capital  gains exclusion)1 
The table shows that these changes raise the corporate  cost  of 
capital  from  6.5 to 7.5 percent  under the new view where cuts  in 
personal  taxes on dividends  are relatively  unimportant  (from 7.7  to 
8.0 under the old view where cuts in dividend  taxes are more 
important).  Under the new view the cost of capital is higher  than 
it was  in 1980, but under the old view it is lower than it was  in 
1980.  Under either financing  assumption,  the attempt  to "level the 
playing  field" was effective  in the sense that the 1986 Act provides 
coefficients  of variation  that are lower than those of other tax 
laws. 
General  equilibrium  results for all tax  laws appear  in Figures 
1—4.  The vertical  axes show the present  value of equivalent 
variations,  in 1984 dollars.  For comparison,  each $200 billion  of 
welfare  gain represents  about 0.2 percent  of total  welfare,  the 
present  value of income plus  leisure in the baseline  of 1980 law. 
Figures  1 and  2 show the new view, while Figures  3 and  4 show the 
old view.  In contrast,  Figures  1 and 3 set the  saving elasticity  at 
0.4 and vary the elasticity  of substitution  among assets, while 
Figures  2 and  4 set the asset  parameter  at 1.0 and vary  the saving 
elasticity.  These figures  can be used to illustrate  the following 
new  results: 
calculations  refer to the  fully phased—in  version  of the  law. 
The model includes  considerable  disaggregation  and detail such as 
the half-year  convention,  the half-basis  adjustment,  LIFO  inventory 
accounting,  and noncorporate  taxes.  It assumes  fully taxable 
firms, however,  and thus  ignores changes  in the minimum  tax, 
passive  loss  rules, and some other  specific  changes  in 1986. —12-- 
A.  The 1ActoesnoBlyasoeneretewelfaregdins,  In 
previous studies such as Fullerton and  Henderson (1985),  each 
industry was constrained  to use  assets in fixed proportions.  That 
model  thus captured  the  intertemporal  welfare  gains of ERTh but  not 
the interasset welfare  losses.  Figure 1  shows  that  HP.TA  does  indeed 
increase welfare when the elasticity  of substitution  is near  zero 
(as  when assets  are  used  in fixed proportions), but  intertemporal 
gains are completely offset if the intarasset substitution parameter 
is  0.7 or Greater.  Under  the old view,  in Figure  3, ERTA's dividend 
tax cuts help to keep welfsra gains positive  until the  mubstitution 
parameter  is more  than  l5.  Figures 2  and  4  ahcw that  tUTU's 
welfare  gains increase with  the  saving elasticity.12 
B.  it  ma be convepient  to use Cobb-Douolas  functional fs 
when_aubstitutiq  arameters  are unknown2  but  result  nba vgxy 
mjedigg  Given the dearth of information  about  the  elasticity  of 
substitution among disaggregate  types of equipment and structures, 
kuerbach  (1981) and Gravalle (1981) use the  common Cobb-Douglas 
form.  Figure  1 shows that the same unit elasticity  assumption  in 
this model would favor the efficiency  of the level playing field in 
the Tax Reform  Act of 1986.  However,  a slightly  lower elasticity 
would favor the 1985 tax  law, end a still  lower elasticity  would 
favor the 1981 Act.  These elasticities  are all within  the  range of 
possible  estinates.  Despite  the apparently  definitive  results  of a 
Cobb-Douglas  model,  we do not know which of the three tax regimes 
has the largest  welfare gain. 
12Note that ERTA has the largest revenue  losses  snd lump  sum tax 
replacement  of any simulation,  so even  these reduced  efficiency 
gains  may be overstated. —13— 
IV.  Conditions for Consistepy 
We  consider  consistency  in terms of economic  efficiency,  end we 
investigate  conditions  in this model share the reforms provide 
successive  weifare improvements.13  Efficiency  gains depend  on tso 
key elasticit7  parereters,  but a  three-dimensional  diaVra guickly 
becomes  unwieidy.  Instead,  Figure  5 varies the two key parametcrs 
under the  new  hay and shoyt the area ov'r  yh1 oh  each reform 
dirinatea,  ERTA la3 Oomt3tes a  other  reforms  in area  A,  the 
1985  lay  .ori3tes in  area  8, nd TRA  536 do:inates in  area  C. 
Figure  9  varica the tsr ke parameters  nder  tnc old vs and  shows 
only  the are,  in whict  the three reforms  generate successive 
improvements,  These figures help demonstrate  the following two 
points: 
A.  Under  one  navy  icy,  tAgs no set of  araretersf  or  wh  let 
tax  ir itiet  i ins  durir the Reaqgn_AstJQ,AuocAfAjyd, 
Figore 5 confirms that the  1981  Act  dominates 
tns other tax regimes,  in terms  of efficiency,  only when the 
elasticity  of substitution  among assets  is small (for  a wide range 
of values  for the  intertemporal  subsitut  ion parameter(  The 1985 
law dominates  when the asset substitution  parameter  is around 0.5, 
and the 1986 Act  dominates  shen  it is larger.  The area  in which the 
1986 Act dominates  is not an area of successive  improvements, 
because  EPTA always  generates  welfare  losses with this high degree 
of interasset  substitution. 
13Because  we use equivalent  variations,  results  are transitive  in 
the sense that the difference  between  the welfare  gains of two 
reforms represents  the welfare  gain in baseline  prices of moving 
from  one reform  to the other. —14— 
Under  the new view, where  dividend  tax reductions  are 
relatively  unimportant,  tax changes may seem  random.  In fact, 
randomness  may cause additional  welfare costs  (skinner,  1986, Alm, 
1988) or benefits (Stiglitz,  1982, Chang and Wildasin,  1986).  The 
apparently  random changes  may arise from shifting  political 
coalitions,  despite  well  ordered individual  preferences. 
Even  under the new view, however,  each change  may have  been a 
rational  response  to available  information  and oomsensus views.4 
Debate  in 1980—81 was heavily  influenced  by the supply-side  school 
of thought,  and the ooosensus  view  may have held  that the  saving 
elasticity  was very high.  In addition, policymakers  may have  been 
uninformed  or unconcerned  about interasset  distortions.  Certainly 
more of the discussion  was  about capital  formation  than about  level 
playing  fields.  Thus ERTA  may have been  viewed as the highest 
ranking reform  on efficiency  grounds.15  Then changes  in tax  law 
through  1985 might be explained  by changes  in the actual or 
perceived  importance  of these distortions.  Discussion  of intarasset 
distortions  did not begin until Auerbach  and Jorgenson  (1980), 
Gravelle  (1981), and Hulten  and Wykoff  (l9slb).  These papers were 
among the first to use Hall-Jorgenson  type formulas  to calculate 
4This  discussion  presumes  that all three analyzed  tax regimes were 
available  as options  in 1981.  Implicitly  they were.  Explicitly, 
in fact, debate  at the time included  consideration  of the Auerbach- 
Jorgenson (1980) first-year  recovery  system,  a proposal  to provide 
economic  depreciation  at replacement  cost.  Although  a major point 
of that  proposal was tc remove the effects of inflation,  its 
results  in this model  vould look very similar to those of the  1986 
legislation  because  we do not consider  varying  inflation. 
15Substitution  elasticities  are generally  high  in the supply-side 
view, however,  and  ERTA would reduce welfare with a high  asset 
substitution  elasticity. —15— 
differences  in the marginal  effective  tax rates  among assets used in 
production.  They came too late to affect the  1981 legislation,  but 
may have influenced  subsequent  changes.  Finally,  stories about tax 
shelters  may have combined with  new results on interasset 
distortions  to raise the  implicitly held elasticity  of asset 
substitution,  making  the Tax Reform  Act of 1986 perceived  as most 
efficient,  Similarly,  new estimates  or other results on 
intertemporal  distortions  may have belprC change  the consensus  views 
about parameters  in Figure 5 from area A, to  B, to C. 
B,  Under  the  old  view,  where  dividend  taxes ratter,  continued 
na ins 
When the saving elasticity is 0.4,  Figure  3  shows  that there is a 
wide band  of values for the asset substitution paraceter  (between 
0.5  and  1.5)  for which each tax change  in the  1980s provides  an 
additional welfare gain.  When the  asset substitution  paraneter  is 
1.0, Figure  4  shows  the  same  result  for all values  of the saving 
elasticity.  With  a  systemmatic  variation  of both  parameters,  Figure 
6 shows that  as the savings elasticity  is higher,  successive 
improvements  occur for a higher  range of asset substitution 
parameters. 
The  figures demonstrate  the possibility  of a coherent agenda  to 
achieve successive  efficiency  improvements.  In fact,  if a signifi-' 
cant part  of marginal  corporate  finance  is new share  issues, then —16— 
recent  tax policy has been consistent  by this definition  for a wide 
range of quite  reasonable  values  of the two key elasticities.16 
This case also sheds some light on the theory  of tax reform, 
which holds that optimal tax changes may result  in a tax structure 
different  from that of optimal  tax design.  Feldstein (1976) 
analyzes  a number of different  implementation  rules,  including 
delayed  effective  dates to allow time  for adjustment,  and Zodrow 
(1981) demonstrates  some advantages  for immediate  enactment  of 
partial  reform.  If results  for the old view are any indication, 
po1icakers may adhere to incremental  reform.  Moreover,  such steps 
may appear  to take  different  directions,  For example,  some 
additional  interasset  distortions  in ERTA may have been a necessary 
political  price of achieving  large reductions  of intertemporal 
distortions,  Changes through  1985 and  1986 may then have addressed 
the interasset  margin  while trying to minimize  losses on the 
intertemporal  margin. 
V. Concluding  Remarks 
Clearly,  tax policy  is not driven by any single criterion  such 
as the measure  of economic efficiency  used in this paper.  Indeed, 
decisions  are not made by any single political  agent.  The different 
policymakers  in this process  place different  relative  weights on 
revenue considerations,  distributional  effects, many noneconomic 
objectives,  and possibly  economic  efficiency.  The limited  purpose 
16  Poterba and Summers  (1983, 1985) find support for the old view of 
dividend  taxes.  Mackie (1985) reviews estimates  of the elasticity 
of substitution  among assets,  and Ballard at al  (1985) review 
saving  elasticities. —17— 
in this paper is to investigate  how the last of these considerations 
may have affected  tax policy decisions  since  1980. 
We employ  a detailed  general equilibrium  model  of the U.S. 
economy  and tax system to evaluate  the efficiency  effects of recent 
tax law changes.  This model  is capable  of second—best  analysis  of 
simultaneous  distortions  in households'  saving decisions,  firms' 
sectoral location  decisions,  and producers'  asset combination 
decisions.  This simultaneity  is important for analyzing  the 
particular  reforms  ccnsidered  here, but  it may come  at the expense 
of a better model  for each distortion  considered  separately. 
Although  this model  is comprehensive,  it is not witnout  limitations, 
It adopts particular  assurptioos,  for example,  that  there are mo 
aujistment  costs,  noncompetitve behacors,  or distortions  other 
than taxes 
One does not  need to accept all the  assumptoons  t the model, 
however,  to follow tOe logic of the interpretations  'iith the new 
view that  taxes on dividends  are relatlvely  unicportant,  recent tax 
reforms appear  inconsistent.  Advocates  of the tconomic  Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981 cay have knowingly  exacerbated  interasset distortions  in. 
order to reduce  intertemporal  distortions,  and subsequent 
legislation  may have been a rational  response  to new information or 
to a new consensus  about the relative  importance  of those 
distortions,  Alternatively,  with  the old view that dividend  taxes 
matter,  these  reforms nay have  been  part of a coherent  plan to 
acheive  greater  economic efficiency  through  incremental  tax  reform. Table 1 
The Cost of Capital and Its Coefficient of Variation 
for Each Tax Regime 
Cost of Capital (%  Coefficient  of Variation 
Corporate 
Sector  Overall 
Across 
Across  Corporate 
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